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1. Introduction
The Republic of Korea has achieved an extraordinary level of economic growth
and wellbeing over the last thirty years. This accomplishment has certainly set a
benchmark for development models and many scholars have devoted their research to
the study and analysis of Korea’s astounding economic performance. Likewise,
international development institutions such as the World Bank praised Korea as a
successful and exemplary student1. It may seem difficult to remember it now but not
long ago countries in Latin America and Asia were told to look at Koreans and try to
imitate their successful economic model (see table 1). Korea was even rewarded for its
extraordinary economic effort and growth with a seat in the selective Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in December 1996. The economy
was impeccable except for a couple of “minor” concerns like a pending financial
reform, an increasing wage/productivity ratio and a low export growth.
One month after joining the OECD, Hanbo Steel, a leading industrial
conglomerate or chaebol, went bankrupt. Even before Korea could celebrate its first
year as an OECD member, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had to provide a
US$ 57 billion’s bailout to avoid the total collapse of the Korean economy.
This paper is an attempt to explain why Korea’s economy has passed from a
model of virtue to the utmost archetype of crony capitalism and bad macroeconomic
management. The discussion starts with a short review of the Korean economy in the
1990s and continues with a chronology of the major events that have shaped the crisis in
Korea. The argument proceeds with an analysis of the major causes of the financial and
currency crises in Korea and explores the possible effects of externalities in domestic
events. The final piece of the discussion deals with current  Korean economic policies
and its implications.
2. The Korean economy before the crisis: The buoyant Korean economy of the
1990s
Triumphalism is the word that best describes the way most Asians perceived the
substantial achievements of their economies in the 1990s. Not long before the trigger of
the Asian crisis, some economists in Hong Kong crowed over the fact that Asian
economies were attaining levels of productivity that surpassed those of the US.  In the
West, some economists contributed to this idea while others seriously questioned the
fundamentals of the Asian economies. Krugman2 pointed out that the Asian economic
miracle was mainly due to an intensive use of inputs, that is, to a high growth rate of
capital and labor inputs. This stand clearly implied that very little total factor
productivity (TFP) growth had occurred in Asia and that the high rates of growth in the
Asian economies were unsustainable in the long run because capital and labor could not
be pumped into the economy for a long time at the same rates. In fact, the crisis in
Korea has had a lot to do with decreasing labor productivity, bad investments and
capital shortage as we will see later in the paper.
Despite Krugman’s criticism, most economists still praised until 1997 the
incredible rates of growth achieved by Korea (see table 1) and admired the surging level
                                                
1 See World Bank (1993), The East Asian Miracle. Economic Growth and Public
Policy. New York: Oxford University Press.
2 See Krugman, Paul, (1994), "The Myth of Asia's Miracle: A Cautionary Fable", Foreign Affairs
of economic well-being of its citizens. In fact, the Korean economy grew at an average
rate of 7.1% between 1992 and 1996 while the GDP per capita surpassed US$ 10,000 at
the end of that period. Employment remained low under 3% and so was inflation3
(stable under 5% for the three years preceding the crisis). Meanwhile, domestic workers
were enjoying ever fattening payrolls. An economic slowdown did take place in 1992,
when GDP growth rate fell to nearly 5%, although this lasted only for about a year.
Some Korean economists pointed out that this slowdown could evolve into a recession
but the truth is that, by 1994, the economy was growing at 8.5% again and the future
was dazzling. A good set of books and scientific articles during these years dealt with
the economic perspectives of the Korean economy for the 21st century4 and publishers
used these catchy headings to increase their sales revenues. Other top-notch and fancy
publishers preferred the word globalization to describe the economic stage of Korea
during those years, clearly alluding chaebol’s success stories in foreign markets.
In fact, the foreign sector was doing quite well. During the early 1990s, Korean
companies expanded their operations abroad and some industrial conglomerates
managed to become true multinational corporations. Korean direct investment was
soaring in China, Southeast Asia, Eastern and Western Europe, the US and even in
Latin America. Due to domestic and regional factors, the export sector was not as strong
as in the old times5. Increasing competition from neighboring countries, decreasing
competitiveness of Korean products, lower world prices for goods such as automobiles,
computer ships, ships and garments, and a recession in Japan and in Europe, among
other factors, contributed to a decrease export growth6 in he nineties.
In summary, the Korean economy was doing relatively well, although it is very
important to note the excessive amount of optimism among economists and policy
makers in Korea and abroad. Moreover, this general optimism proved to be quite
counterproductive because it ignored that some of the fundamentals of the Korean
economy were indeed not so healthy as it seemed. The upcoming presidential elections
and the electoral messages and political arguments employed certainly contributed to
foster the idea of economic soundness7 among the Korean people. This overly
optimistic perspective certainly delayed the necessary reforms that could have helped to
avoid the collapse of the Korean economy in the fourth quarter of 1997.
3. An abridged chronology of the Korean crisis
3.1. From prosperity to agony: the corporate crisis
As we pointed out in the previous part, not many really suspected the upcoming
gloomy future of the Korean economy. Korea’s membership in the OECD was an
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macroeconomic stability, especially when compared with developing economies in Latin America.
4 See, for instance, Cha, Dong Se, K. S. Kim and D. Perkins (1997), The Korean
Economy 1945-1995: Performance and Vision for the 21st Century, Korea Development
Institute, Seoul.
5 One of the cornerstones of Korean economic development in the 60s, 70s, and 80s was precisely an
export led growth strategy. For more details see Kuznets, P. (1994), Korean Economic Development: an
Interpretative Model, Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, pp. 75-102.
6 See Adelman, I. and Song Byung Nak (1998), “The Korean Financial Crisis of 1997-98”, University of
California at Berkeley, mimeographed, p. 1-2
7 See Sanger, D. (1997), “South Korea Ends Efforts to Defend Its Currency”, New York Times, February
4th.
unmistakable indication of the developed countries’ confidence in this East Asian
nation. However, the initial symptoms of fragility shyly appeared while Korea was still
negotiating its accession to the OECD. The current account deficit broadened from 2%
of GDP in 1995 to 5% in 1996, while the growth rate of exports went down from 31%
to 15%. Foreign debt went up from US$ 78 billion in 1995 to US$ 100 billion in 1996.
Moreover, although Korea’s GDP growth rate recorded 5.9% for the first half of 1997,
command GNP stalled at 0.9%, the lowest rate since the second oil shock8. This figure
indicated a tremendous deterioration of the terms of trade for the Asian country, mainly
due to the fall in world prices of Korea’s main export products.
The first evident sign of change in the Korean economy was undoubtedly Hanbo
Steel’s bankruptcy under US$ 6 billion in debts. Hanbo, the 14th largest chaebol in
terms of assets, closed down in January 1997. For the first time in recent Korean
economic history, the government had decided to suspend economic assistance to a big
business group and allow market mechanisms to function. In March, Sammi Steel,
another Korean conglomerate, defaulted inducing fears of a imminent corporate debt
crisis. While Japanese officials hinted a raise in interest rates that would intensify
financial turmoil in Southeast Asia, Korean conglomerates continued to default. After
Sammi came two major affiliates of the Jinro group, the major soju producer in Korea.
The Dainong retail chain and the Ssangyong business group followed through.
In the meantime, the situation in Southeast Asia worsened by leaps and bounds.
In July the 2nd, the Thai baht depreciated and Thailand abandoned the peg system. A
couple of weeks later, Malaysia’s ringgit melted down and Thailand recurred to the
IMF.
In Korea, the situation was not much better although the corporate bankruptcies
had not yet unleashed a major turmoil. Then, one of the nation’s largest chaebol and a
world-known automaker, Kia, suffered a credit crunch and had to ask for emergency
loans. The situation started to seem irreversible but the worst was still to come. Kia’s
crash had a profound impact of the Korean economy and in September, the government
initiated a move to embark on measures to stabilize the banking sector.  Unlike
corporate failures, Korean authorities were concerned with the fact that bankruptcies of
banks could generate far more adverse effects throughout the economy9. Logically,
Korean banks played a crucial role in the credit expansion of domestic companies and
became highly leveraged in doing so. Unfortunately, in spite of the tardy government
efforts to save the economy, the situation was already quite unstoppable by then.
The Philippines, Indonesia, Taiwan, and Singapore suffered a currency
devaluation in the subsequent months and IMF financial aid packages were granted to
Thailand and Indonesia. Moreover, the IMF had confidence in a turnaround of the
economic situation in Asia after the US$ 23 billion deal to Indonesia on October 31st.
However, November would prove to be a fatal month for the Korean economy. The
stock market had dropped 50% from its mid-1997 high and the Korean won started free
falling. Market prices fell sharply as foreign investors pulled out, fearing South Korea
faced an economic crisis on the scale of Southeast Asia's. In turn, these uncertainties
about South Korea put even more pressure on Southeast Asia, creating a spiral of
competitive devaluations that lead to the final collapse of the won on November 19th
and subsequent days. The Korean government had decided on November 18th to
                                                
8 Korean Economic Bulletin (1997), “Command GNP Lowest in 17 Years”, Vol 7;
No.10.; October 1997
9 Korean Economic Bulletin (1997), “Deteriorating Bank Performance-How to Unravel
It”, Vol 7; No.9.; September 1997
suspend efforts to defend its currency. As a result, the won lost 75% of its value in
dollar terms as compared with the mid-1997 high. At that time, foreign-owned short-
term debt amounted to nearly US$ 77 billion and it was unclear whether there were
foreign reserves left to pay it back. This dramatic situation led Korean authorities to call
for a rescue package to international agencies.
3.2. The IMF intervention and the currency and financial crisis
On December the 3rd, the IMF approved the largest financial relief package ever
given to a single country: US$ 57 billion. This agreement urged Korea to follow certain
macroeconomic policies, but the IMF also pressured to pass through other measures.  In
short, the agreement10 i cluded a tightening of the monetary policy to keep inflation at
or under 5%, a revised act to allow for central bank independence, a compromise for a
flexible exchange rate policy, a tight fiscal policy in line with the monetary policy, a
restructuring of the financial sector focusing on consolidate supervision of banks and
conglomerates, trade liberalization, capital account liberalization, several measures
involving corporate governance and corporate structure, a reform of the labor market,
and a more transparent economic and financial information system. This agreement was
widely criticized by many economists including Milton Friedman and others. However,
the IMF policy towards Korea did not vary significantly, although several reviews of
the agreement did take place in January, February, May, and July, as the  situation
deteriorated. Most economists would agree that some of the reforms called for by the
IMF were positive to a certain extent and would have helped to reshape the Korean
economy in a different economic climate. Nonetheless and considering the dramatic
situation of the Korean economy, many economists pointed out too that IMF
requirements were draconian and should have been gradually implemented over a
longer time span. Moreover, the high interest rates and tight monetary control certainly
contributed to deteriorate the situation of many businesses11. The banking sector was
also caught between the devil and the deep blue sea as banks had to meet the
requirements established by the Bank of International Settlements by lowering bad
loans. As a result, banks were forced to call back loans from businesses that could not
return them, creating a spiral.
In spite of the large sum granted by the IMF and the economic and political
commitments of the Korean government, the intervention happened to bring some
transparency to the obscure functioning of the Korean economy. Nevertheless,
international rating agencies decided to downgrade Korea’s bonds to junk status when it
became evident that Korean reserves were insufficient to cover the debt coming due at
the year end. Meanwhile, net foreign lending decreased from US$ 100 billion to US$ –
20 billion in less than two months. Money was flocking out of the country and Korea’s
financial situation was worsening very fast despite the huge bailout conferred by the
IMF. By the end of January, the government reached an agreement with international
commercial lenders on a US$ 60 billion rollover.
The obscure and poorly regulated financial system in Korea could not perform
well in this new environment: high interest rates, increasing bad loans, a gloomy
economic outlook, and a government that could not back the banks’ decisions blindly
anymore.
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Program”, IMF, Washington DC, December, mimeographed.
11 Digital Chosun Ilbo (1998), “OECD Critizes IMF’s Korea Bail-out Plans”, July 26th,
1998.
On January 30th, ten merchant banks closed down. Seven more would follow in
the following months as the economy entered a state of chaos.
4. Background and causes of the financial and currency crisis in Korea
Although it is still unclear what are the main causes of the Korean crisis, there
are to date two basic sorts of arguments.  Radelet and Sachs12 tie the crisis in Korea and,
to a larger extent, in other parts of Asia to the financial panic while Corsetti et al13 argue
that the crisis can be attributed to external or regional pressures and to internal or
domestic factors. A mixture of both would probably help to explain in further detail the
causes of the crisis. However, further research should be undertaken before a specific
weight could be assigned to each argument.
4.1. A worsening situation at home
The fundamentals of the Korean economy remained fairly solid until 1996 (see
table 1 in the statistical appendix). During this year, macroeconomic indicators
worsened to the point that some people hinted the possibility of an economic crisis. In
1997, the crisis was already installed in the Korean economy. The efforts to seize the
crisis were unclear and the government was too wary to present a coherent plan to
restructure the economy.
The proximity of the elections was clearly counterproductive, as the government
did not dare to take immediate action to tackle the problem. A worsening economic
situation, a weak government and the uncertainty brought in by the upcoming elections,
proved to be a dreadful mix.
Some authors14 uggest through a set of empirical data that crisis tend to occur in
emerging countries when output growth is low, growth of domestic credit is high and
the level of foreign interest rates is high. Clearly, this is not exactly the case of Korea
either. Other studies also point out that crashes tend to occur when the inflow of direct
investment dries up, when reserves are low, and when the exchange rate shows
overvaluation.
4.2. Externalities: how much did they matter?
A paper15 by Eichengreen, Rose & Wyplosz focuses on the chances of
contagious currency crisis in a set of industrialized countries. The authors argue that
contagion is more likely to occur in countries that are linked by trade rather than in
countries that have similar macroeconomic characteristics. In fact, Korea was not so
closely linked by trade to Southeast Asian countries. Moreover, the US and Japan are
the main trading partners of Korea. Nonetheless, there are two key issues that should be
                                                
12 Radelet, S. and J. Sachs (1998), “The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis”,
Harvar Institute for International Development, March 1998, mimeographed.
13 Corsetti, G., P. Pesenti and N. Roubini (1998), “What Caused the Asian Currency and Financial
Crisis?”, New York University, September, mimeographed.
14 Frankel, J. A. and A. K. Rose (1996), “Currency Crashes in Emerging Economies: An
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15 Eichengreen, B., A. Rose and C. Wyplosz (1996), “Contagious Currency Crises”,
NBER Working Paper, No. 5681, also in Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 9,
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pointed out. Korean direct investment in Southeast Asia grew fast in the years preceding
the currency crash and the devaluation of Southeast Asian currencies clearly damaged
Korea’s competitive position in the international marketplace. Table 2 shows the
expansion of the current account deficit in Korea and the foreign reserves versus short
term debt and import ratios.
Not only the turmoil in Southeast Asian countries had a negative effect on
Korea. The recession in Japan and the depreciation of the yen were also important
factors that had a direct impact on the Korean economy.  The slowdown of the Japanese
economy started in 1990. As the won was relatively pegged to the dollar, an ever
declining yen/dollar exchange rate meant an appreciation of the Korean currency
against the Japanese one. Since Korea and Japan compete in many sectors, this process
led to a deterioration of Korea’s terms of trade.
4.3. Currency crisis in Korea
The current account deficit grew intensively since 1995 at 4.9% while the
Korean won depreciated against the dollar by 8.6% in 1996 and 5.8% in the first quarter
of 1997. Nonetheless, some economists have pointed out that the main causes of the
currency crisis in Korea were the relatively overvalued won and the growing current
account deficit. Others stress that the current account deficit was not large enough to
provoke a crisis of such magnitude. Park and  Rhee16 argue that currency deficits in
Korea in 1996 and 1997 were temporary and cyclical. The deficit was mainly due to a
fall in the international prices of Korea’s main exports and to the fact that policy makers
regarded investment-led deficits positively. They go on stating that current account
deficits were not as large in Korea as in other countries such as Thailand or Mexico and
therefore it is not plausible to blame the deficit as the main cause of the currency crisis.
Table 3 shows the variations in the exchange rate, as well as in other indicators.
It is somehow shocking that while the exchange rate fell from 965 won/dollar in the end
of October to 1,965 won/dollar in Christmas eve, the stock index KOSPI only fell from
470 to 366. It seems as if the stock market was already very conscious of the
seriousness of the Korea’s economic woes.
5. Possible explanations to the crisis
No single explanation exists for a very complex event like the Korean crisis.
This section will several plausible explanations, focusing mainly on the weaknesses of
the Korean development model, the persisting institutional deficiencies, the ex-a te
policy mistakes and the ex-post responses to the crisis.
The vulnerabilities induced in Korea’s export oriented development strategy had
a clear impact on the crisis. For instance, the worldwide decline in the world demand of
Korea’s most popular exports17 led to a mild recession during the first part of 1997.
Another example of strategy induced vulnerability is the mismanagement of the
allocation of bank credit. As a way to promote exports, the Korean government kept
close control on available credit, set interest rate ceilings, and distributed credit
disregarding economic efficiency. Due to this government policy, debt-equity ratios
rose and the financial structure of corporations became unsound. As financial costs of
corporations became larger, solvency begun to depend heavily on fast growth and
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increasing revenues. Yet, because there was an tacit government commitment to kept on
backing and bailing out banks, financial institutions kept on taking higher and higher
risks.
Some authors have stressed the institutional deficiencies of the Korean financial
system.  In fact, the system was in the borderline between that of a developed and that
of a developing country. While Korea slowly liberalized its financial system, the
government forgot to regulate it properly and to bring information and transparency into
the domestic market. Meanwhile, Korea’s open markets started to operate in the global
financial system without revealing all pertaining information.  It is interesting to point
out that Taiwan and China did not suffer a financial crisis in the magnitude of Korea’s.
As opposed to Korea, China kept a tight control on the financial system while showing
little signs of transparency. On the other side, Taiwan had already liberalized its
financial system and establish an adequate flow of information for investors.
From a macroeconomic policy standpoint, the Korean government was perhaps
too keen on maintaining an overvalued currency.  It is not very justifiable to sustain an
over-inflated won against the yen for a long period of time and it is even less justifiable
to spend 20 billion dollars to defend it. Moreover, the high real interest rate policy
maintained by the government induced domestic firms to borrow abroad, increasing
demand for foreign exchange, and to recur very little to the stock market18. Other policy
mistake was to decontrol real wage growth. During the last few years, the government
supported wage growth for purely political reasons and disregarded the economic
aftermath of this decision.
Adelman and Nak19 suggest that perhaps the worst policy mistake was the drive
towards premature liberalization of capital markets. As it was President Kim Young
Sam desire to join OECD during his term in office, the government rushed to open up
its markets to fulfill OECD admission requirements. The domestic market was not ready
nor regulated enough to open up and, eventually, this led to a crash. It is interesting to
recall that the Mexican crisis occurred only six months after Mexico joined the OECD.
Once the Asian regional crisis begun, the government was not in a position to
respond to the crisis. Just a few months away from the elections, Kim Young Sam’s
team was centered on short term political considerations. Moreover, corruption practices
regarding credit lines to bailout troubled chaebols, specially in the Hanbo steel case, put
banks in a precarious situation. Still, government led rescue plans did not help to solve
the corporate crisis and the situation of the banks grew worse and worse. Later attempts
to control the situation came in too late and were regarded as tardy and unrealistic. The
government was not successful in maintaining the international credibility of Korea.
6. Policy implications and economic perspectives in Korea
6.1. The effects of the IMF rescue package
Transparency was the first change brought in Korea by the IMF rescue plan.
When global markets found out about the real level of foreign reserves, the won/dollar
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exchange rate fell sharply. The IMF20 designed a policy for Korea primarily based on
stringent macroeconomic policies that aimed at restoring stability and confidence in the
country. Money-market rates jumped from 12% prior to the crisis to 27% by the end of
1997. These measures intended to contain the fast outflow of capital and stabilize the
exchange rate. At the same time, money supply growth (M3) should slow down from
16% in 1997 to 13% in 1998. Meanwhile, imports should help to raise foreign reserves
to US$ 40 billion.
Another cornerstone of the IMF plan dealt with fiscal restraint. Before the crisis,
Korea was one of the three OECD members running a national budget surplus.  In
principle, the government was in a good position to expand their fiscal policy in order to
stimulate demand and investment. Despite this budget surplus, the IMF decided to apply
its standard recipe to Korea instead: keep public spending on a leash. The IMF initially
demanded a balanced budget for 1998, although the worsening situation induced the
government to allow for a deficit equivalent to 1.75% of GDP.  Soon it would become
clear that the budget could not even remain at that level.
The request for structural reforms is probably the most interesting and
respectable part of the IMF agreement. The two goals pursued were to expose the
Korean economy more fully to world competition and to introduce more effective
governance structures in the financial and corporate sectors. It seems quite reasonable to
argue that the Korean economy could not follow a path towards globalization while
maintaining such an archaic structure. For example, the domestic car market in Korea
was the paradigm of protectionism21: while Korea exported 850,000 cars per year in
1996, it only imported 10,000. Highly indebted companies were to prepare restructuring
plans to get their finances into shape while the banking sector was also compelled to
enforce several measures imposed by the IMF the Bank of International Settlements
(BIS). At the same time, the government begun a program to make the labor market
more flexible.
In order to understand the implications of the IMF policy, it is useful to adopt an
critical view and observe the results that the agreed measures had on the Korean
economy. While the theoretical framework for the IMF macro-policies may sound very
reasonable, the truth is that raising interest rates provoked a new wave of bankruptcies
of heavily indebted companies. Moreover, higher interest rates increased sharply the
level of bad loans and induced the crash of several banks in Korea. In summary, the
aftermath of some IMF measures has been catastrophic. However, as no “control unit”
exists22, it is impossible to know what would have happened otherwise.
Nonetheless, IMF officials have fiercely  defended their stand and argued that
raising interest rates was unavoidable in order to restore macro-stability. M.
Camdessus23 pointed out that the key lesson of the “tequila crisis” in 1994-95 in Latin
America was that interest rates should stay high temporarily to rebuild investors’
confidence, even if this measure worsened the situation for banks and corporations.
Furthermore, Camdessus argued that IMF programs in Asia and more specifically in
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Korea, aimed at massive restructuring of financial and corporate sectors.
Macroeconomic stabilization plans were only accompanying measures to make the
restructuring more viable.
6.2. Structural adjustments and key reforms
Historically, the Korean people has been used to much suffering: fifty years of
Japanese control, a civil war that split the country into two irreconcilable political and
economic regimes, an exhausting post-war characterized by a tremendous poverty, and
a harsh economic adjustment to quinquennial plans for more than three decades.
This background is, in principle, an advantage to overcome the current economic
problems. Koreans certainly have a strong national consciousness and a set of self-
learned crisis management skills. For these reasons, the necessary restructuring
programs should be implemented smoothly, even if labor unrest hinders the reform
process from time to time.
The corporate restructuring mainly focuses on large conglomerates, on small and
medium sized companies and on state run enterprises. The corporate restructuring
process will benefit transparency by forcing companies to  present consolidated balance
sheets. Moreover, some subsidiaries will be required to close down while the mother
companies will have to improve their capital structure24 and eliminate cross-debt
guarantees. Other measures aiming to improve corporate governance include the
amendment of the Commerce Law to simplify procedures, the promotion of
organizational flexibility, and the smooth exit of non-operative companies.
Financial restructuring refers to banks, insurance companies, securities
institutions, investment & trust institutions, and leasing institutions. The reforms of the
financial sector are primarily directed towards banks. One of the main objectives for the
government is to either merge or close down banks that do not meet the capital
adequacy ratio. The Financial Supervisory Commission will inspect reforms and will
provide guidance throughout the process.
7. Conclusions
The Korean financial and currency crisis has set an impressive precedent on how
global financial and currency markets behave in specific circumstances. The events in
Korea have made clear that capital liberalization should be consistent with exchange
and interest rate policies. Global markets do not forgive mistakes and do not hesitate to
wreck one of the largest economies in the world if the government does not succeed in
the planning and implementation of an appropriate policy mix. If we assume that the
crisis is the result of pure financial panic, it is certainly hard to define mid- or long-term
economic policies that may avoid it. Some authors25 suggest that restrictions on short
term capital flows could help to avoid the negative effects of highly volatile markets on
economic structures similar to that of Korea.
However, if we consider that the Korean crisis is a matter of deeply rooted
economic problems, policy advice should be certainly given much more weight. This
view is perhaps more consistent with the policies required under the IMF bailout
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Asia Development Forum, Manila, March 12, 1998, mimeographed.
agreement. Yet, as the IMF insisted on closely chaperoning the Korean economy to its
recovery, the set of solutions including high interest rates and monetary control policy
mix led the country to a total debacle. In summary, the financial and currency crises has
surely tarnished Korea’s reputation as the paradigm of economic development. It is still
unclear what were the real causes of the crisis and if an appropriate policy mix could
have contributed to palliate it significantly. It is true that the passive attitude maintained
by the Korean government did not help, but neither did the draconian measures imposed
by the IMF.
The Korean crisis will remain as a woeful event that will undoubtedly provide
invaluable lessons to economists and policy makers and that should help to predict and
prevent similar crises in the future.
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Statistical Appendix
Table 1. Republic of Korea: Macroeconomic Indicators.
80-8586-91 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Real GDP growth 6.3 9.9 5.1 5.8 8.6 8.9 7.1
CPI Inflation 10.9 6.1 6.3 4.8 6.2 4.5 4.9
Corporate bond yield 19.0 15.1 16.2 12.6 12.9 13.8 11.9
M2 growth rate 20.6 18.8 18.4 18.6 15.6 15.5 16.2
Fiscal balance/GDP -2.5 -0.2 -0.7 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3
Current account/GDP -3.8 3.0 -1.5 0.1 -1.2 -2.0 -4.9
Foreign reserves (US$b) 7.1 12.2 17.1 20.3 25.7 32.7 33.2
Source: Bank of Korea, Ministry of Finance and Economy
Table 2. Main patterns of the currency crisis in Korea
80-8485-8990-9495.1
2
96.6 96.1
2
97.3 97.6 97.9 97.1
2
Foreign Reserves/
Short-term Debt (%)
63.5 104.2 93.2 72.2 - 54.7 47.9 54.8 46.4 39.8
Foreign Reserves/
Imports (Times)
3.3 2.9 2.6 2.9 3.2 2.7 2.3 2.7 2.4 1.6
External Debt/GNP 48.8 30.2 13.7 17.3 - 21.8 23.0 - 24.9 25.1
Current
Account/GNP
-4.6 4.2 -1.3 -2.0 -2.8 -4.9 -5.6 -5.3 -4.1 -1.3
Current Account
Plus FDI/GNP
-4.6 4.4 -1.5 -2.4 -3.3 -5.3 -5.9 -5.6 -4.4 -
Source: Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistics, various issues.
Table 3. Evolution of relevant indicators
KDB spread
(bp)
Spot Rate
(won/USD)
Forward Rate
(won/USD)
Corporate Bond
Yield (%)
KOSPI
1996 9/27 59 825 834 12.4 793
12/27 56 843 860 12.7 651
1997 1/31 57 861 885 12.0 685
2/28 63 863 881 12.4 676
3/31 72 897 912 12.5 677
4/30 85 892 902 12.5 703
5/30 85 891 899 11.8 746
6/30 85 888 896 11.7 745
7/31 90 892 909 11.9 726
8/29 120 900 940 12.1 704
9/30 119 914 948 12.6 647
10/31 269 965 1,082 12.6 470
11/28 277 1,112 1,233 15.6 411
12/23 693 1,965 1,830 31.0 366
1998 1/30 357 1,689 1,585 18.5 558
2/27 335 1,633 - 20.5 548
Notes: (1) KDB spread: the yield difference between the KDB global bonds due 2006
and the U.S. treasury securities with comparable maturity. (2) Forward rate: three-
month NDF forward exchange rate of the Korean won per U.S. dollar. (3) Corporate
bond yield: the yield of three-year corporate bonds in Korean domestic market. (4)
KOSPI: Stock Price Index
Source: Park, Daekeun and Changyong Rhee (1998), op. cit.
Table 4. Financial Conditions of Top 30 Korean Chaebol at the end of 1996 (in
hundred million won and %).
Chaebol Total
Assets
Debt Sales Net
Profit
Debt/Equity
Ratio
Samsung 508.6 370.4 601.1 1.8 268.2
Hyundai 531.8 433.2 680.1 1.8 439.1
Daewoo 342.1 263.8 382.5 3.6 337.3
LG 370.7 287.7 466.7 3.6 346.5
Hanjin 139.0 117.9 87.0 -1.9 556.9
Kia 141.6 118.9 121.0 -1.3 523.6
Ssangyong 158.1 127.0 194.5 -1.0 409.0
Sunkyong 227.3 180.4 266.1 2.9 385.0
Hanhwa 109.7 97.2 96.9 -1.8 778.2
Daelim 57.9 45.9 48.3 0.1 380.1
Kumho 74.0 61.2 44.4 -0.2 477.9
Doosan 64.0 55.9 40.5 -1.1 692.3
Halla 66.3 63.2 52.9 0.2 2067.6
Sammi 25.2 25.9 14.9 -2.5 3245.0
Hyosung 41.2 32.5 54.8 0.4 373.2
Hanil 26.3 22.3 13.0 -1.2 563.2
Donga Construction 62.9 49.1 38.9 0.4 355.0
Kohap 36.5 31.2 25.2 0.3 589.5
Jinro 39.4 39.0 14.8 -1.6 8598.7
Dongguk Jaekank 37.0 25.4 30.7 0.9 210.4
Lotte 77.5 51.0 71.9 0.5 191.2
Kolon 38.0 28.9 41.3 0.2 316.5
Haitai 34.0 29.5 27.2 0.4 658.3
Sinho Jaeji 21.3 17.7 12.2 -0.1 489.5
Anam Industrial 26.4 21.8 19.8 0.1 478.1
Dongguk Muyok 16.2 13.6 10.7 -0.2 587.9
New Core 28.0 25.9 18.3 0.2 1224.0
Bongil 20.3 18.3 8.7 -0.9 920.5
Hansol 47.9 37.1 25.5 -0.1 343.2
Hansin Kongyong 13.3 11.5 10.6 0.0 648.8
Source: Chosun Ilbo, November 29, 1997.
Table 5. Profitability of Korean Chaebols. ROIC in 1992-1996.
Chaebol 1992-96 1996
Hanbo 3.0% 1.7%
Sammi 2.9% 3.2%
Jinro 2.7% 1.9%
Kia 18.9% 8.7%
Dainong 6.8% 5.5%
Source: LG Economic Research Institute
Table 6. Foreign Liabilities and Assets (toward BIS Reporting Banks)
(US$ billion)
Korea 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1997-
Q1
1997-
Q2
1997-
Q4
Foreign Liabilities 45.22 60.9783.26109.1
5
103.7
8
113.4
2
118.2
5
104.7
1
Foreign Assets 15.20 20.5425.1029.0741.2833.0435.8741.79
Net Liabilities 30.02 40.4358.1680.0862.5080.3982.3862.92
Foreign Liabilities (non-
banks)
10.59 13.4917.9124.0725.1825.9826.5325.40
Foreign Assets (non-banks) 1.45 2.29 3.58 3.47 2.24 3.42 3.06 2.28
Net Liabilities 9.14 11.2014.3320.6122.9422.5723.4623.13
Foreign Liabilities (banks)34.63 47.4965.3585.0878.6087.4491.7279.31
Foreign Assets (banks) 13.75 18.2521.5225.6139.0429.6232.8039.52
Net Liabilities 20.88 29.2443.8359.4739.5657.8258.9239.79
Source: Bank of International Settlements (BIS), International Banking and Financial
Market Developments.
